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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
STATUTES 
Section 16-10-139, Utah Code Ann. (repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 
277, section 248) 
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without 
authority so to do shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or 
arising as a result thereof. 
Section 16-10-88.2(1), Utah Code Ann. (1988)(repealed by Laws 
1992, ch. 277, section 248) 
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more 
than 30 days after the mailing of the notice of 
delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be 
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this 
section or under Section 59-7-155, the division shall 
mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless 
the corporation's certificate of incorporation is 
already suspended for any reason. 
Section 16-10-88.2(1), Utah Code Ann. (1990)(amending 16-10-
88.2(1)(1988)(repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 277, section 248) 
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more 
than 30 days after the mailing of the notice of 
delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be 
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this 
section or under Section 59-7-155, the division shall 
mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless 
the corporation's certificate of incorporation is 
already suspended for any reason. A corporation that 
is suspended continues its corporate existence and may 
carry on any business so long as it also takes the 
necessary steps to remedy its suspended status and 
restore the corporation to good standing. 
Section 16-10-101, Utah Code Ann. (repealed by Laws 1992, ch. 
277, section 248) 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either 
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or 
(2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its 
period of duration, the corporate existence of such 
corporation shall nevertheless continue for the purpose 
of winding up its affairs in respect to any property 
and assets which have not been distributed or otherwise 
disposed of prior to such dissolution, and to effect 
such purpose such corporation may sell or otherwise 
dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued, 
contract, and exercise all other incidental and 
necessary powers, 
RULES 
Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P. 
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in 
which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from 
the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, 
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice 
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P. 
Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the 
trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; 
(3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other 
such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial 
court by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; 
or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, 
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the 
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the 
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or 
denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal 
filed before the disposition of any of the above 
motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal 
must be filed within the prescribed time measured from 
the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of 
the motion as provided above. 
Rule 4(e), Utah R. App. P. 
Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend 
the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion 
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of 
the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A 
2 
motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time 
may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise 
requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of 
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties 
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial 
court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the 
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of 
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE TODD CROSLANDTS ARGUMENT 
I. BOTH OF PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICES OF APPEAL WERE VALID. 
A. This Court does not have jurisdiction to determine 
whether or not the trial court misapplied Utah R. App. P. 
4(e) because Todd did not file a notice of appeal from the 
trial court's order granting Appellants an extension of time 
in which to file their Notice Of Appeal. 
In part I of his Argument, Defendant/Appellee Todd Crosland1 
contends that the trial court misapplied Rule 4(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure when it issued its July 14, 1993, 
Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time in 
which to file their Notice Of Appeal. The merits of Todd's 
argument will be addressed in parts B and C below. 
At the outset, however, it should be noted that this Court 
does not have jurisdiction to consider the trial court's July 14, 
1993, Order, for the simple reason that Todd did not file a 
notice of appeal with respect to that Order.2 See, e.g. Nelson 
v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983)(timely notice of appeal is a 
*In order to distinguish him from Defendant/Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Jeff Crosland, Todd Crosland will hereinafter be 
referred to by his given name. 
2Likewise, Plaintiffs are now foreclosed from challenging 
the trial court's determination that any failure of Plaintiffs to 
timely file a notice of appeal in connection with the February 
18, 1993, Amended Order was not the result of "excusable neglect" 
within the meaning of Rule 4(e), Utah R. App. P. (R.519) 
3 
prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction). 
B. The trial court properly applied Rule 4(e) in granting 
Plaintiffs an extension of time in which to file their 
Notice of Appeal* 
In support of his argument that the trial court misapplied 
Rule 4(e) in issuing its July 14, 1993, Order granting Plaintiffs 
an extension of time in which to file their Notice Of Appeal, 
Todd relies on federal caselaw interpreting Rule 4(a)(5) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(a)(5) of the federal 
rules is virtually identical to Rule 4(e) of the Utah rules. The 
federal caselaw upon which Todd relies interprets the "good 
cause" standard set forth in federal Rule 4(a)(5) as being 
applicable only where a motion for an extension of time is filed 
prior to the expiration of the time for filing an appeal. See, 
e.g., State of Oregon v. Champion International Corporation, 680 
F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). It is Todd's contention that, 
because Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time in the case at 
bar was not filed until after the expiration of the time for 
filing an appeal, the district court abused its discretion when 
it found that Plaintiffs had demonstrated "good cause" for any3 
3As will be discussed below, Plaintiffs do not believe that 
their original March 18, 1993, Notice of Appeal was untimely. 
However, in light of the Motion To Dismiss which was filed by 
Todd with this Court, Plaintiffs requested that the trial court: 
(a) assume that the March 18, 1993, Notice of Appeal was 
premature; (b) find that Plaintiffs had demonstrated either 
"excusable neglect" or "good cause" within the meaning of Rule 
4(e); and (c) grant Plaintiffs an extension of time in which to 
file their Notice of Appeal. The trial court found that 
Plaintiffs had demonstrated "good cause" and granted Plaintiffs' 
request for additional time to file their Notice of Appeal. 
(R.519) 
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failure to timely file their Notice of Appeal. 
As Todd Acknowledges, however, the federal circuits are 
split on the question of whether the "good cause" standard 
applies only to motions filed prior to the expiration of the time 
for filing an appeal or whether it also applies to motions filed 
after the expiration of the appeal time. Criticizing the Oregon 
court's holding that the "good cause" standard applies only to 
motions filed prior to the expiration of the filing period, the 
First Circuit in Scarpa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300, 301 (1st Cir. 
1986), stated that: 
We regard the Oregon courtf s statement that the phrase 
"good cause" is applicable only when the motion is 
filed before the time for filing the appeal has 
expired, 680 F.2d at 1310, as an unwarranted maiming of 
the rule... The rule expressly recognizes fgood cause1 
as a basis for extension both before and after the 
expiration of the appeal time. 
(Emphasis added).4 
Likewise, Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
expressly, clearly5 and unambiguously recognizes "good cause" as 
4Todd refers to the Scarpa court's language as "dicta". See 
Todd's Brief at page 8, n.l. That is not correct. The Scarpa 
court specifically found that "There was no mistake by counsel, 
excusable or otherwise", that the plaintiff had "mistook the 
ground for his motion" when he requested that the trial court 
find "excusable neglect", and that the trial "court should have 
given the motion a practical meaning [citation omitted] as 
including "good cause," and should have found such." 782 F.2d at 
301. 
5In Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1991), 
the court recognized that the language of federal Rule 4(a)(5) 
"could hardly be clearer." See also, Jeffers v. Clinton, 796 
F.Supp. 1202, 1205 (E.D.Ark. 1992) (Eisele, J., 
concurring)("Remarkably, the second sentence of the Rule actually 
does manage to make the first sentence even clearer than it 
already is"). 
5 
a basis for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal both 
before and "not later than 30 days after" the expiration of the 
appeal time.6 
A leading treatise on the federal rules refers to the First 
Circuit's decision in Scarpa as the "better view". 16 Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure, Section 3950, 
page 562 (1993 Supplement).7 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court adopt the 
better view of Rule 4(e) and find that the trial court properly 
applied Rule 4(e) in granting Plaintiffs an extension of time in 
which to file their Notice Of Appeal. 
6It is significant that Rule 4(e) is specific in its 
requirement that motions for extension filed "before the 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte ...", while 
motions filed "after the prescribed time" may be granted only 
after ,f[n]otice [is] given to the other parties in accordance 
with the rules of practice of the trial court." Thus, if the 
drafters of Rule 4(e) had intended for the "good cause" standard 
to apply only to motions filed prior to the expiration of the 
prescribed time, they clearly knew how to say so. 
7The authors explain that "The history of the rule, however, 
has caused most courts of appeals to read the rule differently. 
As originally drafted, the rule allowed an extension on a showing 
of good cause only if the motion was filed during the original 
appeal time; the Note of the Advisory Committee stated that only 
excusable neglect would justify an extension on motion filed 
after expiration of the original time. The text of the Rule was 
changed, but the Note was not changed. Relying on the Note, 
several courts of appeals have held that only a showing of 
excusable neglect ... can justify an extension of appeal time on 
motion filed after expiration of the original time... If this 
view is to be adopted, however, it should be supported by an 
amendment to the Rule that brings the text into conformity with 
the practice... the Rules either should be interpreted to mean 
what they say or should be amended to say what they mean." Id. at 
486-87 (emphasis added). 
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C. Plaintiffs' original March 18, 1993, Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed. 
The Amended Order which is the subject of the instant appeal 
was entered by the district court on February 18, 1993. In 
accordance with Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., however, the Amended Order 
did not become final and appealable until the entry of Judgment 
against Defendant Jeff Crosland on March 9, 1993. Plaintiffs 
filed their original Notice Of Appeal from the Amended Order on 
March 18, 1993. The next day, on March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland 
filed a Rule 59 motion in connection with the Judgment entered 
against him. There were no Rule 50, Rule 52, or Rule 59 motions 
filed in connection with the Amended Order. 
In connection with his Motion To Dismiss Appeal8 filed with 
this Court and again in his brief, however, Todd argues that, in 
accordance with Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Jeff Crosland*s Rule 59 motion filed in connection 
with the March 9 Judgment entered against him operated to toll 
the time for filing a notice of appeal in connection with the 
trial court's February 18, 1993, Amended Order. 
There is no support for Todd's reading of Rule 4(b). To the 
contrary, read in context, a consistent application of Rule 4(b) 
mandates an interpretation pursuant to which Jeff Crosland's Rule 
59 motion operated to toll the notice of appeal filing period 
only with respect to the Judgment entered against him, not with 
respect to the prior unrelated Amended Order. 
8Todd's Motion To Dismiss Appeal was denied by order dated 
August 4, 1993. 
7 
Rule 4(a) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
... the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P.(Emphasis added). Rule 4(b) goes on to 
provide that: 
If a timely [Rule 59] motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party ... the 
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of 
the order denying [the Rule 59 motion]... A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of [the Rule 59 motion] 
shall have no effect. 
Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P. 
Paragraph (a) of Rule 4 speaks only of the "judgment or 
order appealed from". Paragraph (b), in turn, speaks of the 
running of the "time for appeal" upon the filing in the trial 
court of certain post-trial motions and clearly refers to the 
"judgment or order appealed from" addressed in paragraph (a). 
Thus, read together with paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Rule 4 
provides for the tolling of the time for filing an appeal with 
respect to the "judgment or order appealed from," And, even 
though the time for filing an appeal is tolled for "all parties" 
upon the timely filing of the specified motions with respect to 
the "judgment or order appealed from", Rule 4(b) says nothing 
about tolling the time for filing an appeal with respect to all 
orders entered in the case, as Todd would have this Court 
believe. 
Not only is there no Utah case law interpreting Rule 4(b) as 
applying to judgments or orders other than the "judgment or order 
appealed from", Plaintiffs have been unable to find any caselaw 
8 
from any jurisdiction, state or federal, which interprets similar 
rules of appellate procedure in such a manner. 
Furthermore, interpreting Rule 4(b) as applying to all 
judgments and orders entered in a case, rather than only from the 
judgment or order "appealed from", would lead to absurd r 
esults. For example, suppose that (instead of February 18, 1993) 
the Amended Order had been entered in March of 1991 when the 
trial court originally addressed the question of summary judgment 
with respect to ToddfS involvement in this case and further 
suppose that the Amended Order had been certified as final at 
that time in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Finally, suppose that (instead of March 18, 
1993) Plaintiffs had filed their original Notice of Appeal from 
the Amended Order in April of 1991, and that this Court had 
affirmed the Amended Order in April of 1992. Would the filing of 
Jeff Crosland's Rule 59 motion in March of 1993 have operated to 
toll the time for filing the notice of appeal in connection with 
the March 1991 Amended Order. Would Rule 4(b) have rendered 
Plaintiffs' April 1991 notice of appeal of "no effect" and 
required Plaintiffs to file a new notice of appeal "within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the [trial court's May 
25, 1993, order] disposing of the [Rule 59] motion ..." 
Clearly, such a result would be absurd. Yet, that is 
exactly what Todd's interpretation of Rule 4(b) would require. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court 
should reject the interpretation of Rule 4(b) urged by Todd and 
9 
find that Plaintiff's original March 18, 1993, Notice Of Appeal 
was timely filed. 
II. TODD CROSLAND IS LIABLE FOR CROSLAND INDUSTRIES1 OBLIGATIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE HE ASSUMED TO ACT AS A CORPORATION WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY SO TO DO. 
A. Todd misreads the Gillham opinion. 
In Gillham9, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, 
Ipson, personally liable pursuant to Section 16-10-139, U.C.A. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Section 139"), for a debt incurred 
by him on behalf of a suspended Nevada corporation. The Supreme 
Court of Utah identified, inter alia, the following undisputed 
facts involved in the case: (1) Ipson was connected with a 
suspended Nevada corporation named Bonneville Raceways Park; (2) 
Ipson unsuccessfully attempted to qualify the suspended Nevada 
corporation to do business in Utah; and (3) Ipson executed the 
subject agreement by signing "Bonneville Raceways by Robert K. 
Ipson, President." 567 P.2d at 164. 
The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment holding Ipson personally liable for the debt pursuant to 
Section 139. Although the majority opinion is less than a model 
of clarity, read together with the Justice Maughan's dissenting 
opinion, it is clear that personal liability was premised upon 
the fact that Bonneville Raceways had been suspended under Nevada 
law and, therefore, that Ipson had assumed to act as a 
corporation without authority when he executed the agreement on 
9Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 
(Utah 1977). 
10 
behalf of the defunct corporation. 
As does Todd in the case at bar, the Gillham dissent argued 
that Section 139, which is identical to Section 146 of the Model 
Business Corporation Act, was designed to prohibit the 
application of the doctrine of de facto corporations. 567 P.2d 
at 165-66. According to the dissent, the defendant would only be 
liable under section 139 "if Bonneville Raceways does not exist 
as a corporate entity [and] [s]ince Bonneville Raceways is a 
Nevada corporation, whether such an entity is a corporation is 
determined by the laws of Nevada." 567 P.2d at 166. The dissent 
concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate because there 
remained a question of fact as to whether Bonneville Raceways 
still existed as a corporate entity despite its suspended status 
due to the fact that, under Nevada law, its corporate charter 
might not have been revoked until after Ipson executed the 
agreement on behalf of the corporation. 567 P.2d at 167. 
In his brief, however, Todd simplistically contends that the 
Gillham Court upheld the trial courtf s finding of personal 
liability solely by reason of the fact that Ipson signed the 
10The Tenth Circuit agreed with this reading of Gillham in 
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982), 
explaining that "[i]n [Gillham] the Utah Supreme Court found a 
racetrack operator personally liable for an advertising debt of 
his Nevada corporation, according to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. Section 16-10-139, the corporation having become defunct 
under the laws of Nevada... At the time the defendant executed 
the agreement as president of Bonneville Raceways there was no 
such corporation of which he was president. He never qualified 
his corporation to do business in Utah. Bonneville Raceways1 
corporate status was suspended in Nevada for failure to file its 
annual form and pay the filing fee." 
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agreement as president of "Bonneville Raceways", rather than as 
president of "Bonneville Raceways Park." 
Todd's reading of the Gillham decision, while not frivolous, 
renders the dissenting opinion superfluous and should be 
rejected• The dissenting opinion makes clear that the basis of 
the majority opinion was the fact that Bonneville Raceways1 
corporate powers had been suspended under Nevada law and, 
therefore, that Ipson had "assume[d] to act as a corporation 
without authority so to do" in violation of Section 139. 
B. Todd also misreads the "legislative history" to the Model 
Business Corporation Act. 
Based upon the Comment to Section 146 of the Model Business 
Corporation Act, Todd contends that Section 139 was enacted only 
to abolish "de facto" corporations. Assuming that it is 
appropriate for this Court to divine the Utah legislature's sole 
intent in enacting Section 139 from the Comment to the MBCA, 
Todd's argument that Section 139 is not applicable to this case 
is still not persuasive because he defines the doctrine of de facto 
corporations too narrowly. 
According to Todd, "A de facto corporation existed at common 
law where there was a bone fide but defective or incomplete attempt 
to incorporate and the would-be incorporators had done business 
as a corporation."11 While this definition is accurate as far as 
it goes, the "References" which the drafters of section 146 of 
the Model Business Corporation Act direct the reader's attention 
nSee Brief Of Appellee Todd Crosland at page 12, n.6. 
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to, as well as a substantial body of caselaw, clearly reveal that 
it is underinclusive. 
At paragraph 5 of section 146, Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d, 
the drafters reference: "Revival of corporation terminates 
agent's liability on post forfeiture contract, 19 Md L Rev 144 
(1959)." As its title suggests, the Maryland Law Review article 
discusses the personal liability exposure of corporate officers, 
directors and shareholders for contracts entered into during the 
period between the forfeiture of a corporation's charter and its 
revival. At page 146, n.10, of the article, the author notes 
caselaw "where corporate directors or stockholders were not 
personally liable for business conducted after expiration of 
their charter, involving an extension of the doctrine of de facto 
corporations." (Emphasis added). Again at page 148, n.18, the 
author notes the holding in Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 F. 613 (2d 
Cir. 1919), where the "Court stated that during the interval 
between [forfeiture and revival] the corporation was at least a 
de facto corporation. 19 Col. L. Rev., supra, n. 14, takes issue 
with the Court's extension of the de facto corporation doctrine." 
(Emphasis added). 
Again at paragraph 5 of section 146, Model Bus. Corp. Act 
Ann. 2d [1977 Supp.], the drafters reference the Oklahoma court 
of appeals' decision in Phillips & Strong Engineering Co. v. 
Howard B. James Associates, Inc., 529 P.2d 1013 (Okla. Ct. App. 
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1974). The Phillips case raised and answered 
the question of whether ... a corporate officer is 
personally liable for rent becoming due on his 
corporation's month-to-month written rental agreement 
after its license to do business in Oklahoma has been 
suspended by the Oklahoma Tax Commissioner. We hold 
the officer is liable and reverse the court's summary 
judgment in favor of defendant ... 
529 P.2d at 1014 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the drafters of the MBCA clearly had in mind precisely 
the situation involved in the case at bar when they drafted 
section 146. 
The following additional caselaw demonstrates that the de 
facto corporation doctrine has been applied by numerous court's 
where a corporation's powers have been suspended for failure to 
file its annual reports. People v. Zimbelman, 572 P.2d 830, 833 
(Colo. 1977)(corporation suspended for failure to file annual 
report continues to exist as de facto corporation); Billings v. 
Micciche, 691 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Colo. App. 1984)(suspension of 
corporation for failure to pay fees and file annual report does 
not necessarily preclude continued existence as de fdCtO 
corporation) rev'd on other grounds 727 P.2d 367 (1986); McGown 
v. Kittel, 480 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App. 1972)(corporation 
continued to act as a de facto corporation after forfeiture but 
prior to dissolution); Bergy Bros., Inc. v. Zeeland Feeder Pig, 
Inc., 292 N.W-2d 493, 497 (Mich. App. 1980)(generally, a 
corporation failing to meet conditions subsequent to 
incorporation retains de facto status); Clark-Franklin-Kingston 
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Press v. Romano, 529 A.2d 240, 243 (Conn. App. 1987)(Connecticut 
has not yet ruled on the issue of whether a de jure corporation 
which has had its powers suspended can continue to function as a 
de facto corporation). 
Accordingly, even if Todd is correct that Section 139 was 
enacted solely for the purpose of abolishing the doctrine of de 
facto corporations, his argument proves too much. The case at bar 
is precisely the type of case which the drafters of the MBCA 
intended for the Model Act's counterpart to Section 139 to be 
applied. 
C. The language of Section 139 is plain and unambiguous and 
should be construed accordingly. 
Section 139 does not require this Court to divine the 
legislative intent behind its enactment. The language of Section 
139 is plain and unambiguous: 
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without 
authority so to do shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or 
arising as a result thereof. 
This Court has held that "when statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the same to divine 
legislative intent. Rather, we construe a statute according to 
its plain language." Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 
P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah App. 1992). 
Accordingly, Section 139 should be interpreted in accordance 
with its plain and unambiguous meaning, i.e., as mandating joint 
and several liability for all persons who assume to act as a 
corporation without authority to do so. 
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In the case at bar, there is no question that Todd was 
assuming to act as a corporation when he negotiated and 
authorized Jeff Crosland to execute the CI Guarantees. Nor is 
there any question that Todd was without authority to act as a 
corporation due to the suspension of CIfs corporate powers. 
Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 460 
P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 1969)(a suspended corporation cannot engage 
in carrying forward its business)12; see also Carolina 
Transformer Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 341 So.2d 1327 (Miss. 
1977)(owner of suspended corporation personally liable for debt 
incurred while assuming to act as a corporation); Phillips & 
Stong Eng. Co. v. Howard B. James Assoc, Inc., 529 P.2d 1013 
(Okl. App. 1974)(corporate president held personally liable for 
rent obligation incurred after suspension); Priceco, Inc. v. 
Youngstrom, 786 P.2d 606 (Idaho App. 1990)(corporate officers who 
continue business after forfeiture may be held liable for debts 
incurred); Kessler Distributing Company v. Neill, 317 N.W.2d 519 
(Iowa App. 1982)(president of corporation was personally liable 
for debts incurred after forfeiture). 
12In Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, the Court cited as 
additional authority its decision in Houston v. Utah Lake Land, 
Water & Power Co., 157 P. 174 (Utah 1919), "which indicates that 
the right of a corporation whose charter had been forfeited, to 
wind up its affairs, did not authorize it to engage in new 
business." 460 P.2d at 829, n.3. In the case at bar, Todd 
Crosland has not, and could not, argue that the negotiation and 
execution of the CI Guarantees was accomplished as part of the 
winding up of CIfs affairs. 
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It is significant that Section 16-10-88.2(1), U.C.A., was 
amended in 1990 to add the following sentence: 
A corporation that is suspended continues its corporate 
existence and may carry on any business so long as it 
also takes the necessary steps to remedy its suspended 
status and restore the corporation to good standing, 
(Emphasis added). While this sentence was added by the 1990 
amendments, its legislative history states that it was added as a 
clarification of existing law. Act of April 23, 1990, Chapter 
108, 1990 Utah Laws 386. In other words, the addition of the 
last sentence to section 16-10-88.2(1) was not intended to make 
any substantive change to existing law, but, rather, was intended 
to clarify the law as it existed at that time. 
Accordingly, because it is undisputed that Todd failed to 
remedy CI?s corporate status and restore it to good standing, it 
is even more clear that he assumed to act as a corporation 
without authority to do so when he negotiated the CI Guarantees 
after the suspension of CIfs corporate powers. Therefore, 
pursuant to the plain language of Section 16-10-139, he should be 
held personally liable for the guarantees. 
D. The imposition of personal liability pursuant to Section 
139 would not be inconsistent with the winding up powers 
granted in Section 16-10-101• 
Citing Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, 
Inc., 460 P.2d 828 (Utah 1969), Todd contends that "The Business 
Corporation Act cannot be read to require and allow officers and 
directors to wind up the affairs of a dissolved corporation, 
which includes settling claims against the corporation ... and at 
the same time impose personal liability on them for doing so. 
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This conflict would exist if appellants' reading of section 139 
were adopted. "13 
This contention is specious. Neither Mackay & Knobel 
Enterprises nor section 16-10-101, U.C.A. (which grants dissolved 
corporations certain powers during the winding up process) lend 
any support to Todd's position. 
In Mackay & Knobel Enterprises, the Court specifically 
recognized that the "right of a corporation whose charter had 
been forfeited, to wind up its affairs, did not authorize it to 
engage in new business." 460 P.2d at 829, n.3 (citing Houston v. 
Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 187 P. 174 (1919))(emphasis 
added). 
Consistently, section 16-10-101 provides in pertinent part 
that: 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation ... 
the corporate existence of such corporation shall 
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its 
affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of 
prior to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose 
such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers. 
(Emphasis added). 
In short, under Utah law, a dissolved corporation's 
"corporate existence" continues only for the purpose of winding 
up its affairs and the only powers it retains are those which are 
necessary or incidental to accomplishment of the winding up 
13Brief Of Appellee Todd Crosland at pages 15-16, n.7. 
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process. 
Likewise, pursuant to section 16-10-88.2(1), a suspended 
corporation "continues its corporate existence and may carry on 
any business so long as it also takes the necessary steps to 
remedy its suspended status and restore the corporation to good 
standing." (Emphasis added). 
Thus, there is no conflict between Utah law which authorizes 
the exercise of powers necessary or incidental to winding up 
corporate affairs and the imposition of personal liability under 
Section 139 for those continuing to engage in corporate business 
unrelated to the winding up process. 
E. The caselaw relied upon by Todd is distinguishable. 
Todd relies heavily on the Supreme Court of Colorado's 
decision in Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986). In 
that case, the court held that C.R.S. section 7-3-104, a Colorado 
statute identical to Section 139, did not impose personal 
liability upon corporate officers for obligations incurred while 
the corporation's powers were under suspension. In addition to 
finding support in the Comment to the MCBA14, and certain caselaw 
which will be further discussed below, the court's decision was 
based on the peculiar circumstances of Colorado law under which 
section 7-3-104 was enacted, circumstances which were not present 
14As demonstrated in part IIB above, the court's reliance 
upon the Comment to the MBCA is unwarranted. 
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in Utah law in 1953 when Section 139 was enacted. 
As did the Micciche court, Todd also relies on United States 
v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 
1977); Creditors Protective Association, Inc. v. Baksay, 573 P.2d 
776 (Or 1978); and Tagliani v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207 (Wash. 
1973). Each of these cases is distinguishable. 
In Standard Beauty the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower 
court's assumption that section 23301 of the California Revenue 
and Tax Code which provided for the suspension of a corporation's 
powers for failure to pay its franchise taxes "operates to pierce 
the corporate veil absent overriding equities." 561 F.2d at 776. 
There was not a statute similar to Section 139 involved in that 
case. Instead: 
To back up the suspension, the California legislature 
also provided that any contract made in violation of 
section 23301 was voidable at the instance of other 
parties to the contract ... and that any person 
purporting to exercise the corporate powers, rights and 
privileges would be subject to criminal penalties and 
fines. 
561 F.2d at 776. 
15The Micciche court noted that "prior to the enactment of 
section 7-3-104 in 1958, Colorado statutory law imposed personal 
liability on the officers and directors of a corporation for 
corporate debts if the corporation failed to file a corporate 
report [citation omitted] and a later version of this statute 
limited liability to one thousand dollars [citation omitted]. 
However, the Colorado Corporation Act of 1958, of which section 
7-3-104 was an integral part, expressly repealed that statutory 
penalty. If the legislature intended section 7-3-104 to apply to 
officers of a validly formed but suspended corporation, it is 
reasonable to assume that it would have made its intent as clear 
as it had done in its prior enactments." 727 P.2d at 372 
(emphasis added)• 
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The Oregon statute at issue in the Baksay case is similar to 
Section 139, except that it specifically states that joint and 
several liability only attaches to ".••persons who assume to act 
as a corporation without the authority of a certificate of incorporation issued 
by the Corporation Commissioner..." 573 P. 2d at 768, n. 1 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the Oregon statute is clearly limited in a manner 
which Section 139 is not. Compare Richmond Wholesale Meat Co. v. 
Hughes, 625 F.Supp. 584, 588-89 (N.D.I11. 1985) where the court 
distinguished the Oregon statute which "appears to address only 
the situation in which the individuals act as a corporation where 
the incorporation is defective" from an Illinois statute 
identical to Section 139 which it found to be applicable to the 
post-dissolution transaction at issue in that case. 
Finally, while the Washington court of appeals1 decision in 
Tagliani v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207 (1973), is more on point with 
the case at bar, it is still based upon peculiarities in the 
Washington statutes which are not present in the Utah Code. 517 
P.2d at 209-10. 
F. The legislature could not have intended for the issuance 
of a Certificate of Incorporation to function as a license to 
ignore the requirements of corporate existence, as Todd Suggests. 
In order to form a valid de j'ure corporation16, the 
requirements of sections 16-10-48, 49 and 50, U.C.A., must be 
satisfied. In order to maintain its de jure status, a 
corporation must comply with certain post incorporation 
16Under the Utah Business Corporation Act, 16-10-1 et seq. 
(1953)(as amended). 
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corporation must comply with certain post incorporation 
requirements, including filing its annual reports. Utah Code 
Ann, sections 16-10-88.1 and 121. Unless those post 
incorporation requirements of corporate existence are met, the 
corporation's existence is first suspended, section 16-10-
88.2(1), and then, if the corporation fails to remedy its 
suspended status and restore itself to good standing, the 
corporation is dissolved, section 16-10-88.2(4). Upon 
dissolution, the corporation's existence continues only for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs. Section 16-10-101, U.C.A. 
It is Todd's contention, however, that once a Certificate of 
Incorporation is obtained a corporation maintains its de jure 
status, i.e., its corporate existence, until after its post-
dissolution affairs are finally and completely wound up in 
accordance with section 16-10-101.17 
Corporate existence, however, is a creature of state law. 
See, e.g. Gillham, supra, at 166. The fact that the Utah 
legislature has specified that a suspended corporation continues 
to exist and may continue to carry on its business only "so long 
as it also takes the necessary steps to remedy its suspended 
17In light of the fact that a dissolved corporation is 
entitled to commence litigation in connection with pre-
dissolution claims for a period of two years following 
dissolution, section 16-10-100, U.C.A., and is entitled to 
commence litigation in connection with post-dissolution claims 
within the applicable time frame set forth in Chapter 12 of Title 
78 of the Utah Code Ann., see section 16-10-101, U.C.A., the 
process of winding up the affairs of a dissolved corporation can, 
and often does, take many years. 
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status and restore [itself] to good standing"u, and that a 
dissolved corporation's "corporate existence [continues only] for 
the purpose of winding up its affairs ...ltl9, compels the 
conclusion that the legislature did not intend for the "de jure" 
status of a corporation to survive should the corporation choose 
to ignore the requirements of post-incorporation corporate 
existence. 
Just as compelling is the proposition that the legislature 
could not have intended for the issuance of a certificate of 
incorporation to function as a license for corporate agents to 
ignore the requirements of post-incorporation corporate 
existence, as Todd suggests. It is unimaginable that the 
legislature intended to imbue corporate agents with such 
immunity. 
Furthermore, unlike the statutory schemes at issue in the 
cases upon which Todd relies20, other than Section 139, there is 
no statutory provision in the Utah Business Corporation Act to 
back up the prohibition against the continuance of corporate 
business as usual following suspension and dissolution. 
Accordingly, unless Section 139 imposes personal liability on 
corporate agents for continuing to conduct business as usual 
18Utah Code Ann. section 16-10-88.2(1). 
19Utah Code Ann. section 16-10-101. 
20Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986); United 
States v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774 (9th 
Cir. 1977); Creditors Protective Association, Inc. v. Baksay, 573 
P.2d 776 (Or. 1978)(); and Tagliana v. Colwell, 517 P.2d 207 
(Wash. 1973). 
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following the suspension of a corporation's powers, corporate 
agents are indeed, as Todd suggests, free to ignore the 
requirements of post-incorporation corporate existence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs submit that summary 
judgment in Defendant Todd Crosland's favor was improper. There 
was no genuine issue of material fact before the district court; 
however, it was Plaintiffs, not Todd Crosland, who were entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that the district court's February 18, 1993, 
Amended Order be reversed and that this matter be remanded with 
instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment in 
Plaintiffs1 favor on the First Cause Of Action alleged in the 
Amended Complaint. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 1993. 
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